Cooperation or competition?
Commercial applications are not the only factor driving the development of QKD; achieving physically unbreakable cryptography has obvious advantages for national security, imparting geopolitical implications to QKD research. As competitive tensions ratchet up between the US and China, what will the fallout be for QKD research?
One possible trajectory is that China and the West will increasingly traverse separate paths in the development of QKD. It is easy to imagine, for example, how the reluctance of the US government to use technology developed in China—as seen with the exclusion of Huawei hardware from 5G network deployments—might extend to QKD systems, limiting international exchange of information and products.
Given the wide and rapidly increasing gap in QKD progress, governments in the West might choose to fund other avenues of security research for competitive advantage. Indeed, both the National Security Agency in the US and the National Cyber Security Centre in the UK prioritize post-quantum cryptography in their research efforts.
Rather than QKD and quantum cryptography, they are working hard to develop classical algorithms that will remain impossible to crack on a quantum computer, effectively trusting mathematics over physics to keep national secrets secure.
However, it is also possible to envision increased international cooperation, instead of competition, as QKD research and commercialization accelerates. The security of QKD is rooted in the physics of quantum information, rather than secretive algorithms. Therefore, Chinese and Western researchers might plausibly collaborate on research while being sure that their shared knowledge would make it no easier to crack a secure QKD system.
Furthermore, as the usage of QKD becomes more widespread among companies operating both inside and outside of China, the demand for interoperability will also spur the development of shared standards and hence common research interests.
Finally, satellite-based QKD has an important security advantage: unlike ground-based stations, it is much harder to physically access and compromise a satellite. If China seeks to broaden its use of satellite-based QKD, it will share a common interest with Western countries to ensure the continued accessibility and neutrality of outer space for telecommunications satellites.
Perhaps it is time to step back from narrow geopolitical interests and remind ourselves that the pursuit of scientific knowledge is for the betterment of all mankind.
This article was first published in the July 2021 print version of Asian Scientist Magazine.
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Copyright: Asian Scientist Magazine. Illustration: Oikeat Lam/Asian Scientist Magazine.
Disclaimer: This article does not necessarily reflect the views of AsianScientist or its staff.
