OPINION: Japan’s Nuclear Restarts Not A Done Deal

Despite the challenges, Ryan Schaffer says there remains a strong case to be made for nuclear energy in Japan, as its reactors are being replaced primarily by fossil fuels.

AsianScientist (Aug. 20, 2012) – Prior to the March 2011 disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Japan generated around a third of its electricity from nuclear power.

A year and four months since the disaster, following the restart of Reactors 3 and 4 at Kansai Electric’s Oi plant in July 2012, that ratio stands at about two percent.

With its 50 operable reactors (more than 45 gigawatts of installed capacity) sitting idle since the disaster, the Noda administration pushed hard for the restarts at Oi. Before a reactor can be restarted, it must pass a government-administered ‘stress test’ and obtain necessary consent from the local mayor, prefectural governor and prime minister. In the case of Oi, these consents were no sure thing, and came only after an extended political battle.

Nuclear advocates and sceptics alike tended to agree that the first nuclear restarts would be the tough ones. Both sides expected that after the first reactors came online successfully, public concerns around nuclear power would diminish, paving the way for more restarts. However, even in the face of countrywide summer electricity shortages, there are no immediate prospects for further restarts. For several reasons, Oi 3 and 4 may well prove to have been the easyones.

First, the Fukushima disaster has energized an anti-nuclear movement in Japan. The reach of the movement is debatable: accounts of recent anti-nuclear rallies disagree on the number of participants, and it is not yet clear whether the movement represents a majority. What is not debatable is that the anti-nuclear sentiment is strong enough for many political leaders, including former prime minister Naoto Kan, former Democratic Party of Japan president Ichiro Ozawa, and Osaka mayor Toru Hashimoto, to have latched their political fortunes to an anti-nuclear platform. In Japan, three elected officials — mayor, governor and prime minister — hold a de facto power to veto each reactor restart. It only takes one of these three aligning with the anti-nuclear movement to doom a restart campaign.

Second, there has been a clear and pervasive loss of faith in Japan’s nuclear establishment. This point was underscored by a recent Diet investigation that blamed the Fukushima disaster on systemic collusion between industry, government and the regulator. Recognizing the severity of this dynamic, in July 2012 the Diet created a new, semi-autonomous regulator, separate from Japan’s energy ministry. But the new regulator came into legal existence only after the restart of the Oi plant, with no prospects for being staffed and functional until September at the earliest. In the foreseeable future, the regulator overseeing the operation of the Oi reactors will be the very same that oversaw the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi. Far from building confidence, the Oi restarts have likely confirmed concerns about the credibility of the country’s nuclear governance.

Third, the Noda administration instituted a ‘stress test’ to certify a reactor’s safety. Leaving aside concerns over the credibility of Japan’s nuclear regulator (which is responsible for overseeing the test), the very notion of certifiable safety has surely been discredited by the Fukushima disaster. As Fukushima demonstrated, the pertinent question is not whether a reactor is ‘safe’, but rather what are the risks, what level of risk is tolerable, and how can risk be minimized. Notably, Japan’s Nuclear Security Commission chairman, Haruki Madarame, proposed to the administration an additional stress test that would study these very questions (the sort of exercise that has been part of the American Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s safety review process since the Three Mile Island accident in 1979), but the Noda administration declined to make the second test a prerequisite for restart. Though the town of Oi was willing to accept the administration’s safety assurances, there will surely be others for whom they ring hollow.

Finally, with the two restarts at Oi, Japan will technically avoid a summer without nuclear power. However, while two reactors are a boost in terms of electricity prices and grid reliability, Oi 3 and 4 alone are inadequate to ensure supply in the Kansai region this summer, let alone in the rest of the country. For all intents and purposes Japanwill endure a summer without nuclear electricity. Notwithstanding the impact on the Japanese economy of a sustained period without nuclear power, a powerful narrative will have been created that only strengthens the hand of those advocating a nuclear energy-free Japan.

Despite such challenges, there remains a strong case to be made for nuclear energy in Japan. Fukushima made clear enough the risks, but the reality is that, until non-traditional sources of energy, such as wind, solar and geothermal, can be brought to scale as a viable alternative to nuclear energy, Japan’s reactors are being replaced primarily by fossil fuels.

Japan needs its nuclear reactors back online quickly, but it cannot reengage its reactors without the confidence and support of its people — and this cannot be achieved quickly. The Noda administration’s rush to restart nuclear plants is certainly understandable and, in fact, it is not clear what other options it has. But the reality is that any further nuclear restarts are far from being a foregone conclusion. For better or for worse, it is hard to see many more Japanese reactors coming back online anytime soon.

Ryan Shaffer is Associate Director of Programs at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, Washington, DC, and Program Manager for the US–Japan Nuclear Working Group.

——

Source: East Asia Forum; Photo: AAP.
Disclaimer: This article does not necessarily reflect the views of AsianScientist or its staff.

Ryan Shaffer is Associate Director of Programs at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, Washington, DC, and Program Manager for the US–Japan Nuclear Working Group.

Related Stories from Asian Scientist